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The traditional field of cardinal game theory requires that the objective functions, which 
map the control variables of each player into a decision space on the real numbers, be well 
defined.  Often in economics, business, and political science, these objective functions are 
difficult, if not impossible, to formulate mathematically.  The theory of ordinal games has been 
described, in part, to overcome this problem. 
Ordinal games define the decision space in terms of player preferences, rather than 
objective function values.  This concept allows the techniques of cardinal game theory to be 
applied to ordinal games.  Not surprisingly, an infinite number of cardinal games of a given size 
exist.  However, only a finite number of corresponding ordinal games exist.   
This thesis seeks to explore and characterize this finite number of ordinal games.  We 
first present a general formula for the number of two-player ordinal games of an arbitrary size.  
We then completely characterize each 2x2 and 3x3 ordinal game based on its relationship to the 
Nash solution.  This categorization partitions the finite space of ordinal games into three sectors, 
those games with a single unique Nash solution, those games with multiple non-unique Nash 
solutions, and those games with no Nash solution.  This characterization approach, however, is 
not scalable to games larger than 3x3 due to the exponentially increasing dimensionality of the 
search space.  The results for both 2x2 and 3x3 ordinal games are then codified in an algorithm 
capable of characterizing ordinal games of arbitrary size.  The output of this algorithm, 
 iii
implemented on a PC, is presented for games as large as 6x6.  For larger games, a more powerful 
computer is needed.  Finally, two applications of this characterization are presented to illustrate 
the usefulness of our approach. 
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1.0 CARDINAL GAME THEORY AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 
The theory of games has been researched, discussed, and debated for some time.  It was 
first introduced in the 1960’s by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1]. The theory of differential 
games [2] and specifically nonzero-sum differential games [3] emerged as an important area 
within the discipline of optimal control. Game theory has been applied to a wide field of 
disciplines, including electrical and mechanical control, aerospace engineering, economics, and 
even political science.  Nash did pioneering work in the study of non-cooperative game theory 
[4].  Basar and Olsder also explored this field [5].  As the field of non-cooperative game theory 
evolved, the difficulty inherent in mathematically determining useful objective functions became 
clear.  A method of ordinal optimization was presented by Ho, et al [6] in optimizing discrete 
event dynamic systems (DEDS).  Likewise, instead of using payoff functions, Saaty developed 
the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) [7] and [8].  Brams [9] has explored the theory of 
preferential or ordinal rankings.  Thanks to the work of Cruz and Simaan [10], the theory of two 
player ordinal games has recently emerged as an alternative theory that can be used in games 
where the objective function cannot be described mathematically.  Building upon this work, this 
thesis presents a method of characterization for Nash solutions in ordinal games. 
No matter what the field of application, optimization theory focuses on a well-defined 
system, the inputs which act on that system, and the outputs produced by that system.  In general, 
the system defines an objective function, 
1 
 1( , , )nJ x x C=… . (1.1) 
Note that the objective function may be a function of any, all, or none of either the inputs 
or the outputs.  In general, the variables are known as the control variables, since the 
controller can modify them to change the value of the objective function, represented by the real 
number .  The objective function maps the decision space (made up of the control variables) to 
a single real value.  The goal of optimal control is to choose the control variables to minimize (or 
maximize) the value of the function . 
1, , nx … x
,
C
J
 In some cases, the problem must be formulated in terms of multiple controllers, often 
with differing objectives.  In other words, more than one player can affect the value of through 
his control variables.  Player 1 may have the goal of minimizing the value of , while Player 2 
may be interested in simultaneously maximizing .  We will explore the case where each player 
has his own objective function, say  for Player 1 and for Player 2.  Here both objective 
functions can be functions of the control variables for both players.  As such Player 1 must make 
decisions about his own control variables, while understanding that decisions made by Player 2 
will have an effect on his objective function , and vice versa.  If the players are in conflict with 
one another, this situation is called a non-cooperative two player game. 
J
J
J
1J 2J
1J
 
 
1.1 CARDINAL GAMES 
 
Example 1.1: Suppose Player 1 has one control variable, which can take on values 
or .  Likewise Player 2 has one control variable, 
,x
1 2,x x 3x ,y which can take on values 
2 
 1 2, ,y y or 3y .  The objective functions for players 1 and 2 are  and , 
respectively.  The bimatrix game in Figure 1 shows the values of the objective functions for each 
combination of . 
1( , )i jJ x y 2 ( , )i jJ x y
,i jx y
  
Player 2 
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 5.3 , 7.8 3.8 , 1.2 5.7 , 2.4 
x2 9.6 , 3.1 8.7 , 4.0 3.5 , 2.1 Player 1 
x3 3.4 , 9.8 4.6 , 3.9 2.2 , 5.6 
Figure 1: A 3x3 bimatrix game 
 
The upper left cell of the table represents the values of the objective functions and  when 
Player 1 chooses and Player 2 chooses
1J 2J
1x 1y .  In this case 
1 1 1( , ) 5.3J x y = , (1.2) 
2 1 1( , ) 7.8J x y = . (1.3) 
Game theory is a wide field of study, so to correctly categorize games where the outcome 
is determined by the effect control variables have on objective functions, we will refer to games 
like that of Example 1.1 as cardinal games.  We will soon find it beneficial to represent these 
cardinal games in terms of two separate matrices. 
3 
  Example 1.2: For the cardinal game of Example 1.1, the following two matrices can be 
obtained by inspection. 
1
5.3 3.8 5.7
9.6 8.7 3.5
3.4 4.6 2.2
J
⎡ ⎤⎢= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
 (1.4) 
2
7.8 1.2 2.4
3.1 4.0 2.1
9.8 3.9 5.6
J
⎡ ⎤⎢= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (1.5) 
The matrix represents the values of the objective function .  Likewise the matrix 
represents the values of the objective function .  So the value at the [1, 3] position 
in the matrix corresponds to the value 
1J 1( , )i jJ x y
2J 2 ( , )i jJ x y
2J
2 1 3( , ) 2.4J x y = . (1.6) 
 
 
1.2 THE NASH SOLUTION 
 
Now that the game has been defined, and we have sampled a few important 
representations, can we determine the outcome of the game?  In other words, what strategies 
should Player 1 and Player 2 use to achieve an optimal result?  These questions have a number of 
different answers.  The answers depend on the parameters of the game.  For instance, can the two 
players cooperate with one another?  Also, will both players always make the best choice, given 
the strategy of the other player?  Can one player force the other to play in a given manner?  For 
the duration of our discussion, we will assume the players either cannot cooperate, or they have 
opposing objectives, and therefore are not willing to cooperate. Also, we will assume both 
players are equal, i.e. neither player can forcibly exert his will over that of the other, so the game 
4 
 remains balanced.  Since the game is defined in terms of minimization of objective functions and 
the value of both objective functions for any choice of control variables is known to both players, 
we will assume that each player will make the optimal decision. In other words, each player will 
choose the value of his control variable to minimize the value of his objective function in a given 
situation. 
 With these assumptions in mind, it was Nash [4] who first proposed an equilibrium point 
at which the game will eventually come to rest. 
 Definition 1.1: A Nash solution for a cardinal game involving two players is a set of 
values of the control variables { },N Nx y  that satisfies the following set of inequalities 
1 1( , ) ( , ),N N NJ x y J x y x X≤ ∀ ,∈
∈
 (1.7) 
2 2( , ) ( , ),N N NJ x y J x y y Y≤ ∀ . (1.8) 
Here is the set of all possible values of the control variable and X x Y is the set of all possible 
values of the control variable y .  Note in this solution, each player minimizes his objective 
function, given that the other player also uses a Nash strategy.  This definition is illustrated by 
the following example. 
 Example 1.3: Suppose we are witnessing the game of Example 1.1.  Both Player 1 and 
Player 2 are using Nash strategies, that is, they cannot cooperate and they both attempt to 
minimize their respective objective functions at all times.  Suppose Player 2 begins the game by 
playing 3y , then Player 1 will undoubtedly play , since 3x
1 3 3 1 2 3 1 1 3( , ) 2.2 ( , ) 3.5 ( , ) 5.7.J x y J x y J x y= < = < =  (1.9) 
Once Player 2 notices that Player 1 has used , he will certainly change his strategy and 
play
3x
2y , since 
5 
 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 1( , ) 3.9 ( , ) 5.6 ( , ) 9.8.J x y J x y J x y= < = < =  (1.10) 
Finally, Player 1 will respond to strategy 2y from Player 2 by switching , since 1x
1 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 2( , ) 3.8 ( , ) 4.6 ( , ) 8.7.J x y J x y J x y= < = < =  (1.11) 
After this move, Player 2 cannot produce a lower value of his objective function by changing to 
either 1y or 3y , so he is content to stay with strategy 2y .  At this point the game has reached an 
equilibrium state, where neither player is willing to change his strategy.  Thus { }1 2,x y is the 
Nash solution for the game of Example 1.1 since it is the only { },i jx y  pair that satisfies the 
inequalities (1.7) and (1.8). 
 The first choice of Player 2, namely 3y , was arbitrary.  In this game, any initial choice by 
either player will lead to the same outcome.  The game will come to rest with Player 1 choosing 
and Player 2 chosing 1x 2y .  So if both players have complete knowledge of the values of 
and shown in Figure 1, and both players always attempt to minimize their respective 
objective functions, then both players can immediately implement their respective choices 
indicated by the Nash solution.  Under these assumptions, the result of the game will not change. 
1J 2J
 To this point we have not discussed the lack of player cooperation necessary to make the 
Nash solution useful.  A classical game theory problem, the prisoners’ dilemma, illustrates the 
need for this condition. 
 Example 1.4: Suppose that two prisoners are being held in separate cells.  The judge 
meets with both of them individually, and informs each that he has been charged with a major 
crime that carries an eight year prison sentence, and a more minor crime, which carries a two 
year prison sentence.  He has evidence to convict both of the minor crime.  If, however, either 
prisoner divulges information that could implicate the other prisoner in the major crime, the 
6 
 prisoner who divulged the information will have his total sentence cut in half.  The bimatrix for 
this game is given below. 
   
Prisoner 2 
  
divulge do not divulge 
divulge 5 , 5 1, 10 
Prisoner 1
do not 
divulge 10 , 1 2 , 2 
Figure 2: The prisoners’ dilemma 
 
The Nash solution for this game states that both prisoners will in fact divulge information, 
ensuring that they each receive a five year prison sentence.  If they could have communicated, 
and could trust each other, they could have agreed to not divulge any information, and serve only 
two years each.  However that situation is subject to cheating, since either player could shorten 
his prison sentence by divulging information.  Since they cannot trust each other, each acts in his 
own best interest and they will both serve five year sentences.  So a lack of communication, or as 
is more often the case, a lack of trust between adversaries motivates the usefulness of the Nash 
solution technique. 
 We have shown that the games in Example 1.1 and Example 1.4 both have clear Nash 
solutions.  However it is not difficult to imagine a game which does not have a Nash solution. 
 Example 1.5: Suppose we have the following cardinal game, which is a slight 
modification of the game in Figure 1. 
7 
   
Player 2 
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 5.3 , 7.8 6.8 , 1.2 5.7 , 2.4 
x2 9.6 , 3.1 8.7 , 4.0 9.4 , 2.1 Player 1 
x3 3.4 , 9.8 4.6 , 3.9 6.3 , 2.5 
Figure 3: A cardinal game with no Nash solution 
 
In this game, no combination of the control variables will satisfy the Nash inequalities (1.7) and 
(1.8).  Suppose Player 2 starts by choosing 2y .  Player 1 will then play , followed by a choice 
of 
3x
3y  by Player 2, and then  by Player 1.  Player 2 will return to strategy 1x 2y , and the 
sequence will repeat.  So this game has no Nash solution. 
 Likewise it is possible to imagine a game with multiple Nash solutions.  In other words, 
the equilibrium point of the game depends on the starting point of the game. 
 Example 1.6: Suppose we have the following cardinal game, another slight modification 
of the game in Figure 1. 
8 
  
  
Player 2 
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 5.3 , 7.8 3.8 , 1.2 5.7 , 2.4 
x2 9.6 , 3.1 8.7 , 4.0 3.5 , 2.1 Player 1 
x3 3.4 , 3.9 4.6 , 9.8 2.1 , 5.6 
Figure 4: A cardinal game with multiple Nash solutions 
 
If Player 2 begins by choosing 3y , the outcome will see Player 1 choose and Player 2 
choose
3x
1y .  However if Player 2 begins instead by choosing 2y , Player 1 will immediately 
choose , bringing the game to rest at a different point. 1x
 So given an arbitrary cardinal game, we can expect to charactorize it in one of three 
ways, based on the existence of zero, one, or more than one Nash solutions for the game. 
Definition 1.2: A cardinal game is said to have a unique Nash solution if exactly one pair 
of values of the control variables { satisfies inequalities (1.7) and (1.8).  If more than one 
pair of values of the control variables { satisfies the inequalities, the game is said to have 
multiple non-unique Nash solutions. If no pair of values of the control variables 
satisfies the inequalities, the game is said to have no Nash solution.  
, }N Nx y
, }N Nx y
{ ,N Nx y }
9 
  We have given examples of the existence of each of these three types of cardinal games 
for the 3x3 case.  We will assume that cardinal games of all three types exist in general, for 
games of size 2x2 and greater. 
10 
  
 
 
 
 
2.0 ORDINAL GAME THEORY 
  
 
Up to this point, we have assumed the values of the objective functions and are known 
for each combination of the control variables.  Often this is the case.  However, more often these 
values are difficult to calculate.  Sometimes we cannot begin to formulate an effective objective 
function.  Often in disciplines like economics, political science, and international affairs, far too 
many factors exist to be considered in an objective function.  Cardinal game theory is unable to 
effectively handle many of these situations.  Following the lead of Cruz and Simaan [10], we can 
use a different approach to solve these problems, allowing us to formulate a game and apply the 
principles of cardinal game theory.  This different approach is known as ordinal game theory. 
1J 2J
 Suppose instead of determining objective functions for the players, we ask them to rate 
the possible outcomes of the game, in order of preference.  We can assign numerical values to 
these preferences.  To maintain consistency with the discussion above, we will assume the 
outcome a player most prefers will be rated 1, the second most preferred outcome will be rated 2, 
and so on, until all of the possible outcomes have been so ordered.  Now the values of the 
objective functions shown in the matrix can be replaced by these preferential rankings, and the 
principles of cardinal game theory, most notably the Nash solution technique, can be applied. 
11 
  Example 2.1: At the height of the Cold War, both the United States and Soviet Union 
were deadlocked in an arms race1.  Certain factions in each country pushed their leaders to add 
more weapons, while others were in favor of reducing the size of each military.  The ordinal 
game for this situation can be formulated as shown below. 
   
Soviet Strategy 
(Player 2) 
  
Arm Disarm 
Arm 3 ,3 1 , 4 
US 
Strategy 
(Player1) 
Disarm 4 , 1 2 , 2 
Figure 5: The US-Soviet arms race 
 
Certainly it would be difficult, if not impossible for even the most versed international scholars 
and mathematicians to determine suitable objective functions encompassing all of the factors 
under consideration by both the United States and the Soviet Union at the time.  However, it is 
clear that the United States would most prefer that it arm and the Soviet Union disarm.  The 
second choice for the United States would have both countries disarming and ensuring peace.  
The third best option for the United Statess would entail both countries arming, so that if the 
Soviet Union attacked the United States, the United States could defend itself.  In the worst-case 
scenario, United States policy makers would blunder by disarming while the Soviet Union builds 
                                                 
1 This practical application of game theory was presented in a Newsweek article entitled “The Games Scholars Play” 
by authors Sharon Begley and David Grant on September 6, 1982. 
12 
 up its military.  The preferences for the Soviet Union are similar.  Since neither country can trust 
the other, both countries will undoubtedly act in their own best interest.  This formulation of the 
game presents us with values for all of the possible combinations of choices, so we can apply the 
Nash solution techniques.  Although it may be better if both countries disarm, so that war is not 
an option, that outcome will not occur.  The Nash solution to this game illustrates that both 
countries will attempt to arm, which, as history testifies, is precisely what happened. 
 
 
2.1 CONVERSION FROM CARDINAL GAMES TO ORDINAL GAMES 
 
Example 2.1 is at least one case where ordinal game theory greatly simplified what would be 
an extremely complex, if not impossible, problem in cardinal game theory.  In fact, any cardinal 
game can be converted to an equivalent ordinal game.  By equivalent, we mean the 
characterization of the cardinal game based on the existence of Nash solutions, as well as the 
location of any Nash solutions, will be preserved during this conversion.  This conversion can be 
accomplished using the following definition. 
 Definition 2.1: Suppose we have an n m× matrix made up of real numbers.  The 
associated rank-ordered matrix is the 
M
oM n m× matrix where each number is the rank of 
the number in the set{
o
ijm⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
⎤⎦ijm⎡⎣ }, for 1, ,  and 1, ,ijm i n j⎡ ⎤ = =⎣ ⎦ … … m .  If two entries in have an 
equal rank, they are assigned the same value in . 
M
oM
 Example 2.2: The following are some sample matrices and their associated rank-ordered 
matrices. 
13 
 [ ]2.4 1.3 9.8 5.6a =  [ ]2 1 4 3oa =  
4.5 3.2
2.0 1.9
8.0 3.7
K
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
5 3
2 1
6 4
oK
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
3.4 8.7 5.2
7.6 4.3 8.7
1.7 2.0 1.3
T
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
4 8 6
7 5 8
2 3 1
oT
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 Example 2.3: The matrices from Example 1.2, and , which correspond to the game 
in Figure 1, have the following associated rank-ordered matrices, and  
1J 2J
1
oJ 2
oJ
1
6 4 7
9 8 3
2 5 1
oJ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 2
8 1 3
4 6 2
9 5 7
oJ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
 Example 2.4: The cardinal game from Figure 1 can then be converted to an ordinal 
game.  The cardinal game of Figure 1 is repeated here, followed by its corresponding ordinal 
game. 
14 
  
  
Player 2 
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 5.3 , 7.8 3.8 , 1.2 5.7 , 2.4 
x2 9.6 , 3.1 8.7 , 4.0 3.5 , 2.1 Player 1 
x3 3.4 , 9.8 4.6 , 3.9 2.2 , 5.6 
Figure 6: The cardinal game of Figure 1 
15 
  
 
  
Player 2 
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 6 , 8 4 , 1 7 , 3 
x2 9 , 4 8 , 6 3 , 2 Player 1 
x3 2 , 9 5 , 5 1 , 7 
Figure 7: The cardinal game of Figure 1 converted to an ordinal game 
 
As in Example 1.3, the Nash solution remains { }1 2,x y .  We have neither introduced nor 
eliminated any Nash solutions by converting the cardinal game into the ordinal game, so the 
above Nash solution is still a unique Nash solution. 
 Note that, like cardinal games, ordinal games can have more than one Nash solution.  
Take for example the dating game. 
 Example 2.5: Suppose Lynn and Michael are attempting to decide what movie to watch 
on a Friday night.  Lynn would rather see the romantic comedy, while Michael would prefer an 
action movie.  If asked to rate their respective preferences, Lynn and Michael would fill out the 
table below. 
16 
  
Table 1: Lynn’s and Michael’s preferences 
Movie Option Lynn's Preference 
Michael's 
Preference 
Both see the romantic comedy 1 2 
Both see the action film 2 1 
Lynn sees the romantic comedy, 
Michael sees the action film 3 3 
Lynn sees the action film,  
Michael sees the romantic comedy 4 4 
 
Their situation can be described by the game below. 
   
Michael 
  
Romantic 
Comedy Action 
Romantic 
Comedy 1 , 2 3 , 3 
Lynn 
Action 4 , 4 2 , 1 
Figure 8: The dating game 
 
This game actually has two Nash solutions.  If Lynn first refuses to see the action film, Michael 
will undoubtedly see the romantic comedy with her.  Likewise if Michael first refuses to see the 
romantic comedy, Lynn will likely go with him to see the action film.  So in this case, the 
17 
 outcome of the game is uncertain.  In fact, the player who acts first has an advantage, and can 
control which of the two Nash solutions occurs. 
 
 
2.2 CONVERSION FROM ORDINAL GAMES TO MINIMAL ORDINAL GAMES 
 
After converting the cardinal game of Figure 1 into the ordinal game of Figure 7, we can 
simplify the game even more, and obtain the Nash solution more quickly by implementing row 
and column rank-ordering. 
 Definition 2.2: Suppose we have an n m× matrix .  If we say  K
1 2 mc c cK k k k⎡= ⎣ # #"# ⎤⎦
⎤⎦
 (2.1) 
where are column vectors representing the columns of , we can generate the column rank-
ordered matrix by replacing each column of with its corresponding rank-ordered column 
vector such that 
ick K
coK K
1 2 m
co o o o
c c cK k k k⎡= ⎣ # #"# . (2.2) 
 Example 2.6: This example illustrates the process of generating a column rank-ordered 
matrix using matrix from Example 2.2. T
3.4 8.7 5.2
7.6 4.3 8.7
1.7 2.0 1.3
T
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
4 8 6
7 5 8
2 3 1
oT
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
2 3 2
3 2 3
1 1 1
coT
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 Definition 2.3: Suppose we have an n m× matrix .  If we say  K
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2
n
r
r
r
k
k
K
k
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
"
"
#
"
⎥
⎥
 (2.3) 
where are row vectors representing the rows of , we can generate the row rank-ordered 
matrix by replacing each row of with its corresponding rank-ordered row vector such that 
irk K
roK K
1
2
n
o
r
o
r
ro
o
r
k
k
K
k
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
"
"
#
"
. (2.4) 
 Example 2.7: This example illustrates the process of generating a row rank-ordered 
matrix using matrix from Example 2.2. T
3.4 8.7 5.2
7.6 4.3 8.7
1.7 2.0 1.3
T
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
4 8 6
7 5 8
2 3 1
oT
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
1 3 2
2 1 3
2 3 1
roT
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
The Nash inequalities (1.7) and (1.8) actually apply only to one row or one column of the game 
matrix at a time.  Hence we can use row and column rank-ordered matrices to simplify our 
search for Nash solutions. 
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  Example 2.8: Using the ordinal game from Example 2.3 and Example 2.4, we can 
implement row and column rank-ordering to simplify the problem.  First we find the column 
rank-ordered matrix associated with and the row rank-ordered matrix associated with . 1
oJ 2
oJ
1
2 1 3
3 3 2
1 2 1
coJ
⎡ ⎤⎢= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
 (2.5) 
2
3 1 2
2 3 1
3 1 2
roJ
⎡ ⎤⎢= ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (2.6) 
The matrix for Player 1, , needs to be column rank-ordered.  For any given choice made by 
Player 2, Player 1 will rank his preferences, and choose to play the strategy with the rank of 1.  
So if Player 2 selects
1
oJ
1y , Player 1 will use strategy .  Likewise if Player 2 chooses3x 2y , Player 1 
will respond with , and so on.  The matrix for Player 2 needs to be row rank-ordered for 
similar reasons.  If we formulate the game bimatrix using and  we have the following 
game. 
1x
1
coJ 2
roJ
20 
  
  
Player 2 
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 2 , 3 1 , 1 3 , 2 
x2 3 , 2 3 , 3 2 , 1 Player 1 
x3 1 , 3 2 , 1 1 , 2 
Figure 9: The minimal ordinal game from Figure 7 
 
Since we can now be sure that each player will always choose the strategy indicated by a 1, we 
can quickly see by inspection that the unique Nash solution for this game is { }1 2,x y .  In other 
words, any time we recognize the pattern {1,1} in a given entry, we can be sure that entry 
corresponds to a Nash solution for the game. 
Definition 2.4: We will refer to ordinal games that have been column and row rank-
ordered as minimal ordinal games. 
 You may have noticed some similarities between prisoners’ dilemma (Example 1.4) and 
the Cold War arms race (Example 2.1).  If we apply column and row rank-ordering to both 
games, it becomes clear that they are actually the same game. 
 Example 2.9: The game below is the minimal ordinal game for both the prisoners’ 
dilemma and the Cold War arms race. 
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Player 2 
  
y1 y2
x1 1 , 1 1 , 2 
Player 1 
x2 2 , 1 2 , 2 
Figure 10: Minimal ordinal game for the prisoners’ dilemma and the Cold War arms race 
 
 We can begin now to see the power of ordinal games, and specifically minimal ordinal 
games.  In this case, two 2x2 ordinal games, each describing very different situations, can both 
be represented by one minimal ordinal game, without any change to the characterization of the 
games based on their Nash solutions.  Each ordinal game encapsulates an infinite continuum of 
cardinal games, and each minimal ordinal game encapsulates a finite number of ordinal games.  
The following example illustrates a method of representing the former of these two concepts. 
Example 2.10: Suppose an international scholar determined the objective functions to 
describe the strategies of both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War arms 
race.  The cardinal game, using the scholar’s objective functions, is given below. 
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USSR Strategy 
  
Arm Disarm 
Arm 6.9 , 7.6 2.5 , 9.3 
US 
Strategy 
Disarm 8.8 , 0.4 3.7 , 3.2 
Figure 11: A cardinal game representation of the Cold War arms race 
 
Since we defined the situation as an ordinal game in Figure 5, we can replace each of the values 
in the game of Figure 11 with a range of values without affecting the outcome of the game. 
   
USSR Strategy 
  
Arm Disarm 
Arm (5.3,7.9] , (5.4,8.3] [0,3.1] , (8.3,•) 
US 
Strategy 
Disarm (7.9,•) , [0, 2.0] (3.1,5.3] , (2.0,5.4] 
Figure 12: The cardinal game of Figure 11 expressed using a range of values 
 
23 
 Thanks to this simplification, the scholar is now free to modify the objective functions with 
confidence, knowing that he will not change the outcome of the game so long as the values of the 
objective functions in each case remain within the specified ranges.  If the value of one of the 
objective functions does stray outside one of the given ranges, that may serve as a warning about 
the effectiveness of the objective function.  The objective function should adhere to the simple 
dynamics of the game defined in Figure 5, since the preference rankings in the ordinal game 
represent each player’s final objective.  Figure 12 is a representation of the infinite continuum of 
cardinal games represented by the ordinal game of Figure 5. 
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3.0 2X2 ORDINAL GAMES 
 
 
3.1 A GENERAL 2X2 ORDINAL GAME 
 
To better understand the simplifications possible when we implement column and row rank-
ordering to convert ordinal games into minimal ordinal games, we will first explore the simplest 
non-trivial case, 2x2 ordinal games.  Both Brams [9] and Rapoport, et al. [11] recognize 78 
different 2x2 ordinal games.  Rapoport, et al. further categorize these games into 24 groups.  
Based on our Nash solution characterization in Definition 1.2, we will show that only 16 
different 2x2 ordinal games exist.  To understand this characterization, we need to imagine a 
general 2x2 ordinal game.  We have already demonstrated that at least two specific 2x2 ordinal 
games correspond to the same minimal ordinal game (the prisoners’ dilemma and the Cold War 
arms race).  Suppose we have the following general 2x2 ordinal game. 
25 
  
   
Player 2 
  
y1 y2
x1 a , w c , y 
Player 1 
x2 b , x d , z 
Figure 13: A general 2x2 ordinal game 
 
Here the values and represent the unknown preferences of Player 1 and 
Player 2, respectively.  Without knowing any of these values, what can we determine about this 
game?  If we allow the expression  to represent the number of possible permutations of 
objects in places we can determine the total number of different ways the general 2x2 ordinal 
game of Figure 13 can be played.  Since Player 1 can assign any of four preference values (1, 2, 
3, or 4) to the variables , he has a total of 
, , ,a b c d , , ,w x y z
( , )P s t
s t
, , ,a b c d
(4, 4) 4! 24P = =  (3.1) 
possible strategies.  Likewise Player 2 has 24 possible strategies.  Since each player can assign 
his preferences independently of the other player, the game of Figure 13 can be played in 
 different ways.  In other words, only 576 possible 2x2 ordinal games exist.  So, any of 
the infinite number of cardinal games can be converted into one of the 576 possible ordinal 
games. 
224 576=
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3.2 MINIMAL ORDINAL GAME SIMPLIFICATION 
 
The conversion from cardinal games to ordinal games has proven fruitful.  However can we 
perform the same analysis for the conversion from ordinal games to minimal ordinal games?  
Suppose we have the matrices  for Player 1 and  for Player 2 as follows 1J 2J
1 2and .
a c w y
J J
b d x z
⎡ ⎤ ⎡= = ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
If we find the column-rank ordered matrix and the row rank-ordered matrix , we have 
effectively created a general minimal ordinal game, based on the ordinal game in Figure 13.  It is 
easy to list all of the possible ways the matrices and can occur. 
1
coJ 2
roJ
1
coJ 2
roJ
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1
 or  or  or 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
co co co co
A B C DJ J J J
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = = =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1
 or  or  or 
1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
ro ro ro ro
A B C DJ J J J
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= = = = ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
So Player 1 and Player 2 each have only four strategies, not twenty-four strategies, meaning the 
total number of possible minimal ordinal games is only 24 16= .  Since we showed in Chapter 2 
that the simplification from ordinal games to minimal ordinal games preserves all Nash 
solutions, we can be confident that throughout this simplification we have lost no information 
about the Nash solution characterization of the game of Figure 13.  Now instead of dealing with 
576 possible 2x2 ordinal games, we really have to consider only 16 2x2 minimal ordinal games. 
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  We can easily list all 16 of those minimal ordinal games.  The 16 minimal ordinal games 
have been labeled according to their relationship to the column and row rank-ordered matrices 
and .  So the game labeled 11
coJ 2
roJ B,2A corresponds to the game where the players use the 
strategies and .  Note that the Nash solutions have been highlighted in bold type. 1
co
BJ 2
ro
AJ
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P2  
P2
 
P2
 
P2
1A,2A
y1 y2  
1A,2B
y1 y2
 
1A,2C
y1 y2
 
1A,2D
y1 y2
x1 1,1 1,2  x1 1,1 1,2 
 
x1 1,2 1,1 
 
x1 1,2 1,1 
P1
x2 2,1 2,2  
P1
x2 2,2 2,1 
 
P1
x2 2,2 2,1 
 
P1
x2 2,1 2,2 
 
    
              
P2  
P2
 
P2
 
P2
1B,2A
y1 y2  
1B,2B
y1 y2
 
1B,2C
y1 y2
 
1B,2D
y1 y2
x1 1,1 2,2  x1 1,1 2,2 
 
x1 1,2 2,1 
 
x1 1,2 2,1 
P1
x2 2,1 1,2  
P1
x2 2,2 1,1 
 
P1
x2 2,2 1,1 
 
P1
x2 2,1 1,2 
                   
P2  
P2
 
P2
 
P2
1C,2A
y1 y2  
1C,2B
y1 y2
 
1C,2C
y1 y2
 
1C,2D
y1 y2
x1 2,1 2,2  x1 2,1 2,2 
 
x1 2,2 2,1 
 
x1 2,2 2,1 
P1
x2 1,1 1,2  
P1
x2 1,2 1,1 
 
P1
x2 1,2 1,1 
 
P1
x2 1,1 1,2 
                   
P2  
P2
 
P2
 
P2
1D,2A
y1 y2  
1D,2B
y1 y2
 
1D,2C
y1 y2
 
1D,2D
y1 y2
x1 2,1 1,2  x1 2,1 1,2 
 
x1 2,2 1,1 
 
x1 2,2 1,1 
P1
x2 1,1 2,2  
P1
x2 1,2 2,1 
 
P1
x2 1,2 2,1 
 
P1
x2 1,1 2,2 
Figure 14: All 16 possible 2x2 minimal ordinal games. 
29 
  Note that we can now easily characterize the previously discussed 2x2 games by 
matching each with one of the sixteen games of Figure 14.  Both the prisoners’ dilemma and the 
Cold War arms race are the same as the minimal ordinal game 1A,2A.  The dating game is the 
same as the minimal ordinal game 1B,2B.  Likewise, any other 2x2 game can be reduced to one of 
these sixteen minimal ordinal games. 
 This sort of simplification can be very appealing when one player has incomplete 
knowledge about the strategy of the other player.  In this case, the player must consider all 
possible outcomes of the game.  This simplification eliminates unnecessary effort, and in some 
cases can direct a player toward the best course of action. 
 
 
3.3 CHARACTERIZATION OF NASH SOLUTIONS FOR 2X2 GAMES 
 
Since we have listed all of the possible 2x2 minimal ordinal games, we can categorize 
these games based the existence of zero, one, or more Nash solutions.  By inspection we can 
determine that twelve 2x2 minimal ordinal games have a unique Nash solution, two 2x2 minimal 
ordinal games have multiple, non-unique Nash solutions, and two 2x2 minimal ordinal games 
have no Nash solution. 
 Furthermore, we note that the unique Nash solutions are distributed equally among the 
four combinations of the control variables.  The following table shows the relationship between 
the 2x2 games listed in Figure 14 and the location of unique Nash solutions. 
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Table 2: Distribution of the unique Nash solutions in 2x2 minimal ordinal games 
Unique Nash 
Solution Location 2x2 Games 
[1,1] 1A,2A; 1A,2B; 1B,2B A
[1,2] 1A,2C; 1A,2D; 1D,2C
[2,1] 1C,2A; 1C,2D; 1D,2A
[2,2] 1B,2C; 1C,2B; 1C,2C
 
On the other hand, non-unique Nash solutions occur in only two games, 1B,2B and 1D,2D and 
only on the diagonal and the off diagonal. 
 Since the simplification from cardinal games to ordinal games and from ordinal games to 
minimal ordinal games resulted in no loss of Nash solutions, we can apply these results to both 
ordinal and cardinal games.  If twelve out of sixteen, or three-fourths of all 576 2x2 minimal 
ordinal games have unique Nash solutions, then three-fourths of all 2x2 ordinal games, or 432 
games, have unique Nash solutions.  Likewise 72 2x2 ordinal games have no Nash solution and 
72 2x2 ordinal games have two non-unique Nash solutions. 
 So if we know nothing about the objective functions in a 2x2 cardinal game, we can 
predict the game has a 75% chance of having a unique Nash solution, a 12.5% chance of having 
no Nash solution, and a 12.5% chance of having more than one Nash solution. 
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3.4 GENERALIZATION OF THE MINIMAL ORDINAL GAME SIMPLIFICATION 
 
Next, we have to wonder if these results can be generalized to minimal ordinal games larger 
than 2x2.  In the definition of the rank-ordered matrix from the oM n m× matrix (Definition 
2.1), we stated that entries in which have equal values should be ranked with the same 
preference.  As such we would expect the number of preferences to adhere to 
M
M
pn
pn nm≤ . (3.2) 
For the rest of the discussion, we will assume instead 
pn n= m . (3.3) 
In other words, no repeated entries exist in .  With this assumption in mind, we can begin to 
generalize the results from the 2x2 case.  Suppose we have an ordinal game defined by the 
matrices and .  We already know the total number of possible ordinal games is 
given by .  
oM
n m× 1J 2J n m×
2(( )!)nm
If we instead consider minimal ordinal games, we find that, as expected, we can 
significantly reduce the number of possible games.  In an 
n m×
n m× game, the decision space for 
Player 1 contains choices, and the decision space for Player 2 contains choices.  For any 
given choice made by Player 2, Player 1 can arrange his  choices into locations.  This means 
he can play 
n m
n n
( , ) !P n n n=  (3.4) 
strategies for each choice made by Player 2.  Since Player 1 can choose each strategy 
independently, he has a total of ( possible strategies. !)mn
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  Example 3.3: Suppose we have the following 3x5 ordinal game.  Note that the 
preference rankings of each player are unimportant in this example, so they are not shown.   
P2
 
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
x1           
x2           P1
x3           
 Number of strategies:        3!       3!       3!       3!      3! 
Figure 15: Number of P1 strategies for each choice by P2
 
If Player 2 uses 3y , Player 1 can respond with any of 3! 6= possible strategies.  Likewise if 
Player 2 uses 5y , Player 1 can respond in 3! 6=  ways, all of which are independent of his to 3y .  
As such, Player 1 can use  possible strategies to play the game. 5 5( !) (3!) 6 7,776mn = = =
The same logic can be applied to the situation faced by Player 2.  He can play a total of 
 strategies.  Since both players are free to choose their strategies 
independently, a total of  
3 3( !) (5!) 120 1,728,000nm = = =
( !) ( !) (7,776)(1,728,000) 13,436,928,000m nn m = =  
minimal ordinal games exist.  This is a tremendous number of possibilities, but the simplification 
from ordinal to minimal ordinal games is even more startling.  Table 3 shows some samples of 
the number of possible ordinal games and possible minimal ordinal games for games of various 
sizes. 
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Table 3: Comparison between ordinal games and minimal ordinal games 
Game Size Number of Ordinal Games Number of Minimal Ordinal Games 
2x2 576 16 
2x3 720 288 
3x3 362,880 46,656 
3x4 479,001,600 17,915,904 
4x4 2.09x1013 1.10x1011
8x8 1.27x1089 4.88x1073
10x10 9.33x10157 1.57x10131
 
Even for games as small as 3x3, the simplification from ordinal games to minimal ordinal games 
is significant. 
 Given an n  minimal ordinal game, we would ideally like to have a general formula 
for the number of games that have a unique Nash solution, the number that have multiple non-
unique Nash solutions, and the number that have no Nash solution.  However this generalization 
has proven very difficult to formulate.  Instead, we can gain more insight by exploring another 
special case, 3x3 ordinal games. 
m×
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4.0 3X3 ORDINAL GAMES 
 
 
4.1 EXPLORATION OF 3X3 MINIMAL ORDINAL GAMES 
 
 Suppose we have the following two 3x3 minimal ordinal games. 
  
Player 2 
   
Player 2 
  
y1 y2 y3  
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 1 , 1 3 , 3 2 , 2  x1 1 , 1 3 , 2 2 , 3 
x2 3 , 2 2 , 3 3 , 1  x2 3 , 3 2 , 2 3 , 1 
Player 
1 
x3 2 , 1 1 , 3 1 , 2  
Player 
1 
x3 2 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 3 
Figure 16: Two similar 3x3 minimal ordinal games 
 
These two 3x3 minimal ordinal games are similar, but they are clearly different games.  Note 
however that { }1 1,x y is a unique Nash solution for both games.  In fact, the flow of game play 
will commence exactly the same for both games.  If Player 2 begins by choosing 3y , the game 
play will be as follows 
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 3 3 1 1y x y→ → → x
1x
. 
Likewise if Player 1 begins with strategy , the game play for both games will be 2x
2 3 3 1x y x y→ → → → . 
Since each player will always choose his best strategy in the given situation, we can easily 
follow the flow of the game by noticing where the top-rated preferences (the 1’s) are located.  So 
in truth, these two minimal ordinal games will always have the same outcome, the Nash solution 
{ }1 1,x y .  Also, given an arbitrary starting point, both games will commence in the same manner. 
 Since the top-rated preferences of each player in a given situation are the only pieces of 
information necessary to determine the Nash solution and the flow of the game, we can ignore 
the other preferences and concentrate on only where the 1’s will occur. 
 
 
4.2 TOP-RATED PREFERENCE MINIMAL ORDINAL GAME SIMPLIFICATION 
 
Suppose we have a 3x3 matrix , the matrix for Player 1 in a minimal ordinal game. 1
coJ
1
1 1 1
coJ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= × × ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥× × ×⎣ ⎦
 
Here the ×  characters represent don’t care conditions in six of the entries in the matrix.    These 
don’t care conditions could be any preference ranking.  If we fix the 1’s at locations [1,1] and 
[1,2], and allow the 1 in column 3 to change position, we have the following three possible 
strategies. 
36 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 or 1  or 
1
× ×⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× × × × × × × ×⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× × × × × × × ×⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
Likewise if we fix the 1’s in in locations [1,1] and [2,2], we can generate three more 
possibilities. 
1
coJ
1 1 1 1
1  or 1 1  or 1
1
× × ×⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× × × ×⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× × × × × × × ×⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
× ×
×
1
× ×
 
Finally, if we fix the 1’s at locations [1,1] and [3,2], we come up with three other possibilities. 
1 1 1 1
 or 1  or 
1 1 1
× × ×⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× × × × × × × ×⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× × × × ×⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
. 
Each of these nine cases can be duplicated for the three possible locations of the 1 in the first 
column, giving us a total of 27 ways Player 1 can arrange his top-rated preferences.  Likewise 
Player 2 can arrange his top-rated preferences in 27 ways.  So in order to find the number of 
games that have a unique Nash solution, the number that have multiple non-unique Nash 
solutions, and the number that have no Nash solutions, we need to consider only 
games.  In Table 3, we determined that we would need to consider 46,656 3x3 
minimal ordinal games.  Clearly this simplification greatly minimizes the number of possibilities, 
while still preserving the Nash solution characteristics of each game. 
227 729=
 Note that each of the 27 possible strategies which Player 1 can use represents a 
multiplicity of minimal ordinal games.  In each column, Player 1 has two preferences to rank, 
besides his top-rated preference.  He can order those two preferences in two locations, meaning 
for each of the three columns, Player 1 has (2, 2) 2! 2P = =  independent choices for his other 
preferences.  Thus each of the 27 strategies Player 1 can use represent his strategies in 
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 32 = 8 minimal ordinal games.  The situation is identical for Player 2.  Using this multiplicity, we 
can arrive at the total number of 3x3 minimal ordinal games in Table 3. 
27 8 27 8 46,656∗ ∗ ∗ = . 
 
 
4.3 GENERALIZATION OF THE TOP-RATED PREFERENCE MINIMAL 
ORDINAL GAME SIMPLIFICATION 
 
Given an minimal ordinal game, Player 1 can place a 1 in each column of his matrix 
in any of the rows.  Since has columns, Player 1 can position his 1’s in ways.  
Likewise Player 2 can position his 1’s in ways. 
n m×
1
coJ n 1
coJ m mn
nm
 Once Player 1 has positioned his 1’s in a given manner, he can arrange the remaining 
preferences in  locations, meaning he has a total of  1n − 1n −
( 1, 1) ( 1)P n n n− − = − !  (4.1) 
options in each column.  Since the matrix has columns, Player 1 can arrange all of these 
other preferences in ways.  Thus the possible strategies Player 1 can use each 
represent a multiplicity of minimal ordinal games.  Likewise the possible 
strategies Player 2 can use each represent a multiplicity of  minimal ordinal games. 
1
coJ m
(( 1)!)mn − mn
(( 1)!)mn − nm
(( 1)!)nm −
 So given an minimal ordinal game, if we consider only the top-rated preferences 
for each player, a total of  different games exist. 
n m×
( )( )m nn m
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  In Chapter 3 we found that using minimal ordinal games, Player 1 has possible 
strategies.  Now we have decreased that number even more, showing that Player 1 really has 
only possible strategies.  Note that using the multiplicity of each of those strategies, we have 
( !)mn
mn
(( 1)!) ( ( 1)!) ( !)m m mn n n n n− = − = m . (4.2) 
Thus we have again lost no Nash solutions by focusing only on the top-rated preferences for each 
player.  Table 4 shows some comparisons between the number of minimal ordinal games and the 
number of top-rated preference minimal ordinal games. 
Table 4: The number of minimal and top-rated preference minimal ordinal games 
Game Size Number of Minimal Ordinal Games Number of Top-rated Preference Minimal Ordinal Games 
2x2 16 16 
2x3 288 72 
3x3 46,656 729 
3x4 17,915,904 5,184 
4x4 1.10x1011 65,536 
8x8 4.88x1073 2.81x1014
10x10 1.57x10131 1.00x1020
 
Without a general formula for the number of higher order games having unique, non-unique, and 
no Nash solutions, this simplification offers tremendous computational advantages.  Using this 
simplification to top-rated preference minimal ordinal games, we can devise an algorithm to 
determine the number of games that have unique Nash solutions, the number that have multiple 
non-unique Nash solutions, and the number that have no Nash solution. 
 All 729 top-rated preference minimal ordinal games of size 3x3 are listed in Appendix A.  
As in Figure 14, the Nash solutions have been highlighted in bold type. 
 Example 4.1:  Suppose a dairy must determine each day which one of the following 
types of milk to produce: whole milk, 2% milk, or skim milk.  On a given day, the company 
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 profit per unit of milk depends on the type of cheese a certain cheese producer is making that 
day.  The dairy supplies milk to the cheese producer, but the dairy does not know which type of 
cheese will be produced on any given day.  Viewed as a two player game, we can determine the 
following bimatrix.  The values in the bimatrix represent the dairy’s profit per unit of milk, in 
dollars.  The question marks represent the unknown preferences of the cheese producer. 
 
  
Cheese Producer 
  
Colby Cheddar Swiss 
Whole 10 , ? 9 , ? 6 , ? 
2% 7 , ? 5 , ? 12 , ? Dairy 
Skim 2 , ? 3 , ? 8 , ? 
Figure 17: Dairy profits 
 
If the dairy is attempting to maximize its profit, and considers only at its top-rated preferences, 
we have the following top-rated preference minimal ordinal game, where the x’s represent don’t 
care conditions. 
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Cheese Producer 
  
Colby Cheddar Swiss 
Whole 1 , ? 1 , ? x , ? 
2% x , ? x , ? 1 , ? Dairy 
Skim x , ? x , ? x , ? 
Figure 18: Dairy top-rated preferences 
 
Given these prefences for the dairy, we know the cheese producer can play one of only 27 
strategies.  Furthermore, we can be certain that unique Nash solutions can occur only in locations 
[1,1], [1,2], and [2,3].  The dairy can easily examine all 27 possible strategies of the cheese 
producer, and determine where the unique Nash solutions are most likely to occur.  The 27 
possible games have been highlighted in the list of all 729 3x3 top-rated preference minimal 
ordinal games in Appendix A.  We can determine by inspection that twelve of the 27 strategies 
the cheese producer can use will result in games that have either no Nash solution or multiple 
Nash solutions.  Of the fifteen remaining games, six of the games will have a unique Nash 
solution at location [1,1], six will have a unique Nash solution at [1,2], and only three will have a 
unique Nash solution at location [2,3].  If the game is played on 27 consecutive days, six days 
will end up with the Nash solution at [1,1], six days at [1,2], and three days at [2,3].  If the dairy 
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 executives examine the profits in Figure 17, they should recognize that whole milk and Colby or 
whole milk and Cheddar will occur more often than 2% milk and Swiss.  As Figure 17 shows, 
the dairy’s highest profits occur in the least likely of the unique Nash solutions.  The dairy 
should then modify its process to increase profits in the two situations that will occur most often.  
If the dairy does increase its profits in these two cases, its top-rated preferences will not change, 
meaning the Nash solutions of the games will not be affected. 
So without any knowledge of the strategy of the other player involved in the game, our 
results allow the dairy to quickly determine where they need to optimize their process to 
maximize their profits. 
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5.0 NASH SOLUTION SEARCH ALGORITHM 
 
 
5.1 EXPLANATION OF TOP-RATED PREFERENCE MINIMAL ORDINAL GAME 
SEARCH ALGORITHM 
 
In the absence of a general formula for the number of top-rated preference minimal ordinal 
games which have a unique Nash solution, multiple non-unique Nash solutions, and no Nash 
solution, we can describe and implement an algorithm to search all possible top-rated preference 
minimal ordinal games of a given size.  When this algorithm is devised as a recursive algorithm, 
the result is surprisingly simple. 
 In general, a recursive algorithm must have two cases, a recursive case where the 
algorithm calls itself, and a base case where the algorithm does not call itself and ends the 
recursion.  Since our goal is to compare each strategy of Player 1 with each strategy of Player 2, 
it makes sense to pick a given strategy for Player 1, and compare that to all possible strategies for 
Player 2.  Next the algorithm should pick another, different strategy for Player 1 and compare 
that to all strategies for Player 2.  This process should repeat until all strategies for Player 1 have 
been exhausted. 
 So the algorithm should have one recursive function that loops through all strategies for 
Player 1.  For each strategy of Player 1, that function should call another recursive function that 
43 
 loops through all strategies for Player 2.  Pseudo code describing the algorithm used to find all 
strategies for Player 1 is given below. 
player1_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows,num_columns,column) 
{ 
 row = 1 
 while (row <= num_rows) 
 { 
  p1_game[row,column] = 1 
  if (column == num_columns) // Base case 
  { 
   player2_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows, 
 num_columns,1) 
  } 
  else     // Recursive case 
  { 
   player1_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows, 
       num_columns,column+1) 
  } 
  p1_game[row,column] = 0 
  row = row+1 
 } 
} 
 
The player1_stategies function is called with the num_rows and num_columns parameters 
equal to the number of rows and columns, respectively, in the game.  The column parameter is 
initially passed with a value of 1, for the first column.  The pseudo code for the algorithm to find 
all of the strategies for Player 2 is given below. 
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player2_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows,num_columns,row) 
{ 
 column = 1 
 while (column <= num_columns) 
 { 
  p2_game[row,column] = 1 
  if (row == num_rows) // Base case 
  { 
   game_type = categorize_game(p1_game,p2_game) 
   if (game_type == unique_nash) 
   { 
    num_unique_nash = num_unique_nash+1 
   } 
   else if (game_type == non_unique_nash) 
   { 
    num_nonunique_nash = num_nonunique_nash+1 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    num_no_nash = num_no_nash+1 
   } 
  } 
  else    // Recursive case 
  { 
   player2_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows, 
       num_columns,row+1) 
  } 
  p2_game[row,column] = 0 
  column = column+1 
 } 
} 
 
To better understand this algorithm, consider the simplest case, that of a 2x2 ordinal game. 
 Example 5.1: Suppose we want to use this algorithm to categorize all of the 2x2 top-
rated preference minimal ordinal games.  In the first call to player1_strategies, we’ll have the 
following values for the input parameters: 
p1_game = [0 0] 
     [0 0] 
p2_game = [0 0] 
     [0 0] 
num_rows = 2 
num_columns = 2 
column = 1 
 
After we put a 1 in position [1,1] of the p1_game, we will make the recursive call to 
player1_strategies with the following input parameters: 
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 p1_game = [1 0] 
     [0 0] 
p2_game = [0 0] 
     [0 0] 
num_rows = 2 
num_columns = 2 
column = 2 
We will then add another 1 to p1_game, this time in position [1,2].  Since we have reached the 
last column (column 2), we’re at the base case, and will call p2_strategies with the following 
parameters: 
p1_game = [1 1] 
     [0 0] 
p2_game = [0 0] 
     [0 0] 
num_rows = 2 
num_columns = 2 
row = 1 
Next we will set a 1 in position [1,1] of p2_game, and call player2_strategies again, with the 
following parameters: 
p1_game = [1 1] 
     [0 0] 
p2_game = [1 0] 
     [0 0] 
num_rows = 2 
num_columns = 2 
row = 2 
Finally, we set a 1 in position [2,1] of p2_game and hit the base case, where we call 
categorize_game with the following parameters: 
p1_game = [1 1] 
     [0 0] 
p2_game = [1 0] 
     [1 0] 
This game has a unique Nash solution at location [1,1], so we increment the number of unique 
Nash solutions.  Next we set a 0 in position [2,1] of p2_game, go to the top of the loop, and set a 
1 in p2_game at position [2,2]. We’re again at the base case, so we call categorize_game with 
the following parameters: 
p1_game = [1 1] 
     [0 0] 
p2_game = [1 0] 
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      [0 1] 
Now return from the second call to player2_strategies, and are back in the first call to 
player2_strategies with 
row = 1 
column = 1 
 
We set a 0 in position [1,1] of p2_game and go to the top of the while loop.  There we set a 1 in 
position [1,2] of p2_game, and make a call again to p2_strategies with the following 
parameters: 
p1_game = [1 1] 
     [0 0] 
p2_game = [0 1] 
     [0 0] 
num_rows = 2 
num_columns = 2 
row = 2 
After examining the two possibilities for row 2 of this p2_game parameter, we have finished 
comparing all four strategies of Player 2 to the initial strategy of Player 1.  We then return from 
the first call to player2_strategies, get the next strategy for Player 1, and start the process 
again. 
 The complete program listing implementing the Nash solution search algorithm can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 
 
5.2 RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE ALGORITHM 
 
The following table lists the number of games examined, the number of games with a unique 
Nash solution, the number of games with multiple non-unique Nash solutions, and the number of 
games with no Nash solution for games of varying sizes. 
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 Table 5: Results of Nash solution search algorithm for games of varying sizes 
Game 
Size 
Number of Top-rated 
Preference Minimal 
Ordinal Games 
Number of Games 
with a Unique Nash 
Solution 
Number of Games 
with Multiple Nash 
Solutions 
Number of Games 
with No Nash 
Solution 
2x2 16 12 2 2 
2x3 72 48 12 12 
3x3 729 423 150 156 
3x4 5,184 2,808 1152 1224 
4x4 65,535 33,184 15,432 16,920 
5x5 9,765,625 4,581,225 2,419,520 2,764,880 
6x6 2,176,782,336 973,830,816 552,255,120 650,696,400 
 
Note that the number of games with multiple Nash solutions and the number of games with no 
Nash solution is the same only for the 2x2 and 2x3 cases.  Also, note how quickly the number of 
games grows, even with the top-rated preference minimal ordinal game simplification. 
 It may be more useful to view these results as percentages of the total number of games 
for a given size. 
Table 6: Percentage results of the Nash solution search algorithm 
Game Size 
Percent of Total 
Games with a Unique 
Nash Solution 
Percent of Total 
Games with Multiple 
Nash Solutions 
Percent of Total 
Games with No Nash 
Solution 
2x2 75.00% 12.50% 12.50% 
2x3 66.67% 16.67% 16.67% 
3x3 58.02% 20.58% 21.40% 
3x4 54.17% 22.22% 23.61% 
4x4 50.64% 23.55% 25.82% 
5x5 46.91% 24.78% 28.31% 
6x6 44.74% 25.37% 29.89% 
 
Note that as the size of the game increases, the number of games with unique Nash solutions, as 
a percentage of the total number of games, decreases.  These percentages seem to be approaching 
a point of stability where an increase in game size no longer has a noticeable impact on the 
percentages.  The figure below shows the values from Table 6 in a graph. 
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Figure 19: Nash solution distribution for nxn Games 
 
 Even with data for games only up to size 6x6 we can observe an asymptotic trend, and 
conjecture that the number of games with a unique Nash solution won’t make up less than 40% 
of the total number of games.  Likewise the number of games with either multiple Nash 
solutions, or no Nash solution, won’t exceed about 30% of the total number of games, 
respectively. 
The time to examine larger and larger games can quickly grow beyond the realm of 
possibility.  The following table lists the times2 required to run the algorithm. 
                                                 
2 These times were obtained using the GNU time command on a computer with an Intel Pentium II 333 MHz 
processor running Linux kernel version 2.6.10. 
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Table 7: Execution times of the Nash solution search algorithm 
Game Size Time to Complete Algorithm 
2x2 0.001 seconds 
3x3 0.002 seconds 
4x4 0.068 seconds 
5x5 12.780 seconds 
6x6 59 minutes 10.175 seconds 
 
In the 6x6 case, the algorithm required about 3,550 seconds to examine 2,176,782,336 games, 
which corresponds to a rate of about 613,178 games per second.   At this rate, without the top-
rated preference minimal ordinal game simplification or the minimal ordinal game 
simplification, it would take years to come to the same conclusion!  Even using the 
minimal ordinal game simplification, a comparable computer would require  years of 
processing time.  The following table shows the length of time required to consider games of 
higher order at this rate. 
279.37 10×
211.00 10×
Table 8: Time to consider all possible games at a rate of 613,178 games per second 
Game Size Time to Examine all Minimal Ordinal Games 
Time to Examine all Top-rated 
Preference Minimal Ordinal Games 
7x7 3.53x1031 years 12.8 days 
8x8 2.52x1060 years 14.6 years 
9x9 6.16x1086 years 7,762 years 
10x10 8.10x10117 years 5.17x103 years 
 
So despite the advantages of the top-rated preference minimal ordinal game simplification, 
computational barriers still exist. 
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6.0 APPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
6.1 INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE 
 
Even with these computational barriers, the top-rated preference minimal ordinal game 
simplification has some appeal.  Our initial assumptions about the Nash solution stated that both 
players must have knowledge of the strategy of their opponent.  Certainly as the game is played 
out, this is the case.  However before the game begins, each player most likely has limited, if any 
knowledge of the strategy of the opposing player.  Example 4.1 (the dairy and cheese companies) 
began to explore this concept of incomplete knowledge.  If a given player can examine all of the 
possible responses by his opponent to a given strategy, the player can in some sense score that 
strategy.  By scoring a few feasible strategies, the player can determine which strategy is best or 
optimal. 
 The process described above can occur without the simplifications discussed, but these 
simplifications decrease the number of possible opposing strategies to consider, and therefore 
give the player using the simplifications an advantage.  If no cost is incurred by acting first, it is 
always in a player’s best interest to act first, since that often allows the player to dictate which 
Nash solution those games with multiple Nash solutions will settle on.  If Player 1 acts first, he 
can often choose a strategy that will allow him to be sure that all of the games with a unique 
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 Nash solution and those with multiple Nash solutions will work to his benefit.  The following 
example, taken in part from [12], will illustrate this concept. 
 Example 6.1: Suppose we have a cardinal game formulated as follows.  Two competing 
firms are attempting to determine which of three products to advertise.  The options for Firm 1 
are products .   The options for Firm 2 are products 1 2 3, ,  or x x x 1 2 3, ,  or y y y .  The values of the 
objective functions and  for each combination of choices are given in the following 
figure. 
1FJ 2FJ
  
Firm 2 
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 8 , 10 5 , 8 8 , 7 
x2 7 , 5 8 , 6 11 , 7 Firm 1 
x3 5 , 6 9 , 9 7 , 7 
Figure 20: The product advertisement cardinal game 
 
In this example, Firm 1 is attempting to maximize  and Firm 2 is attempting to maximize .  
If we simplify this game to a top-rated preference minimal ordinal game, we can quickly 
determine the Nash solutions. 
1FJ 2FJ
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Firm 2 
  
y1 y2 y3
x1 1 , 1 x , x x ,x 
x2 x ,x x , x 1 , 1 Firm 1 
x3 x , x 1 , 1 x , x 
Figure 21: The product advertisement top-rated preference minimal ordinal game 
 
If Firm 2 acts as the leader (in the Stackelberg sense [12]), then the rational reaction set for Firm 
1 is { }1 1 2 3 3 2{ , },{ , },{ , }D x y x y x y= .  Thus the Stackelberg strategy for Firm 2 as leader would 
be the pair in that maximizes , 3D
2FJ 1 1{ , }x y .  This leaves the objective function of Firm 1, , 
valued at 8.  From the perspective of Firm 1, this is the worst of all the Nash solutions.  It would 
be in the firm’s advantage to act first.  In this case, the rational reaction set for Firm 2 is also , 
but now Firm 1 can advertise , forcing Firm 2 into the Nash solution at , the best 
Nash solution for Firm 1.  If both the firms would like to compromise, each could reach a middle 
ground by selecting the Nash solution at .  Firm 1 can gain the upper hand by acting 
1FJ
D
2x 2 3{ , }x y
3 2{ , }x y
                                                 
3 Note that in this example, the members of the rational reaction set D correspond to the three Nash solutions of the 
game.  In general this is not the case, and in general, the method of this example would not apply.  The Stackelberg 
strategy is used to show which of the Nash solutions Firm 2 would likely prefer, if it could act as first.  Since we 
assume that neither firm can forcibly exert its will upon the other, neither can actually act as leader. 
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 first. At worst, Firm 1 can minimize its losses in the compromise case.  If however, Firm 1 waits 
to act second, it is likely to end up in its worst case scenario.   
 In a more realistic case, Firm 1 may be aware of the values of its own objective function, 
but most likely it knows little if any information about the objective function of Firm 2.  Using 
the top-rated preference minimal ordinal game simplification, Firm 1 needs to consider only 27 
possible strategies of Firm 2.  If Firm 1 were to consider all ordinal games (  Firm 
2 strategies) or even all minimal ordinal games (  Firm 2 strategies) it would be 
wasting time and resources, and would not be able to react as quickly.  If Firm 2 chooses the 
following strategy, 
2(3 )! 362,880=
3(3!) 216=
2
1
1
1
FJ
× ×⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= × ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥× ×⎣ ⎦
 
Firm 1 must act quickly to begin its advertising first and focus on advertising , so it can avoid 
the Nash solution at , like the situation initially explored.  Likewise if Firm 2 uses another 
strategy, say 
3x
1 1( , )x y
2
1
1
1
FJ
× ×⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= × ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥× ×⎣ ⎦
 
Firm 1 can be assured that the situation will come to rest at the only Nash solution, , and 
Firm 1 need not waste resources by speeding up its advertising since acting first offers it no 
advantage.  Firm 1 may instead attempt to negotiate with Firm 2 and share the market.  In this 
way, Firm 1 can quickly examine all of the possible outcomes of the game and formulate a 
course of action for each possible strategy of Firm 2.  So before the game begins, Firm 1 can 
1 1{ , }x y
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 know not only what its course of action will be, but even more so, it can know the likelihood that 
each course of action must be taken. 
 
 
6.2 CATEGORIZATION OF SOLUTION TYPE 
 
In [13] Basar outlines three different types of solutions for games involving Stackelberg 
strategies.  His solutions (viewed from the perspective of two player games) can be classified as 
follows. 
Type A: Concurrent Solution. 
Although they act non-cooperatively, both players realize that the optimal solution for 
each occurs when one of the two is the leader.  As such, the other player cooperates in becoming 
the follower. 
Type B: Nonconcurrent Solution. 
In this case, both players would benefit from becoming the leader.  As Basar points out, 
the player who can process data more quickly will become the leader and gain an advantage. 
Type C: Stalemate Solution. 
 Here both players will actually benefit from being the follower.  As such, neither player 
desires to act first.  Basar explains that a reasonable solution can be reached if both players 
negotiate or bargain in some way. 
 Although Basar explored Stackelberg strategies, these three solution types can be likened 
to the three Nash solution types discussed here.  From the Nash solution perspective, Basar’s 
Type A solution is similar to an ordinal game with a unique Nash solution.  Since the equilibrium 
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 point of the game is determined, both players can non-cooperatively agree on the solution.  
Likewise Type B solutions correspond to ordinal games with multiple Nash solutions, where the 
outcome is uncertain until play begins, and each player can gain an advantage by acting first.  
The original game in Example 6.1 has a Type B solution.  Finally, Type C solutions correspond 
to ordinal games with no Nash solution.  In this case, an equilibrium state will not be reached, 
and the players must negotiate or modify the parameters of the game. 
 Using the top-rated preference minimal ordinal game simplification, one player can more 
quickly examine the strategies of the opposing player and can categorize each possible game into 
one of the above types.  If the game has a Type A solution, the player need not waste valuable 
resources by attempting to act first.  If the game has a Type B solution, the player can begin 
processing data in an attempt to act first and control the game.  If the game has a Type C 
solution, the player can approach his opponent at the bargaining table, or attempt to modify his 
own strategy. 
 Assuming that the player can determine the cost of implementing any of his own 
strategies, he can then formulate a cost/benefit analysis for each possible strategy employed by 
his opponent. 
 Example 6.2: Suppose Company 1 formulates strategies for production in two different 
sectors of the market.  Although Company 1 cannot determine the strategy of its competitor, 
Company 2, in either sector, it can eliminate a few possible strategies which are not available to 
Company 2.  After analyzing all possible games for competition in sector X, Company 1 finds 
that 67% of the games have a Type A solution, 10% of the games have a Type B solution and 
23% of the games have a Type C solution.  So in sector X, Company 1 will benefit by acting first 
in only 10% of the possibilities (those games with a Type B solution).  However in sector Y, 
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 Company 1 finds that 53% of the games have a Type B solution, whereas only 16% of the games 
have a Type A solution and 31% of the games have a Type C solution.  In sector Y, Company 1 
will benefit in 53% of the games by acting first.  Thus Company 1 should devote its resources to 
sector Y, in an attempt to act first and control the game.  If Company 1 can make this decision 
faster than Company 2, it will likely waste fewer resources in sector X.  So the top-rated 
preference minimal ordinal game simplification can allow Company 1 to more quickly determine 
its best course of action. 
 Based on the numerical results presented in Chapter 5, we can see that as the size of the 
game grows, the likelihood of a Type A solution decreases.  As discussed, the number of games 
of each solution type seems to stabilize.  However if the game is larger than 4x4, fewer than 50% 
of the solutions will be of Type A.  So without knowing anything about the game, a player can 
immediately realize that in more than half the games he can likely gain an advantage by acting 
first, either by controlling a Type B solution or coming to the bargaining table quickly without 
wasting resources in a Type C solution. 
 
 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Throughout this thesis, we have explored an important subset of game theory known as 
ordinal game theory.  Since the objective functions in cardinal games are often difficult or 
impossible to determine mathematically, ordinal game theory offers an attractive alternative to 
cardinal game theory.  Every cardinal game can be converted into a corresponding ordinal game.  
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 Since only a finite number of ordinal games of a given size exist, it is possible to list each ordinal 
game and characterize it according to the number of Nash solutions for the game. 
 Based on this characterization, three different types of ordinal games exist: those with 
only one unique Nash solution, those with multiple non-unique Nash solutions, and those with no 
Nash solution. 
 Despite the finiteness of the set of n m× ordinal games, for even small values of and 
any attempt to analyze the total number of possible games can reach beyond the realm of 
computational possibility.  However, we have shown that using the minimal ordinal game 
simplification and the top-rated preference minimal ordinal game simplification, games as large 
as 6x6 can be brought into the realm of computational possibility. 
n
m
 For games of arbitrary size, we have described and implemented a recursive algorithm to 
compute the number of top-rated preference minimal ordinal games which have a unique Nash 
solution, the number which have multiple non-unique Nash solutions, and the number which 
have no Nash solution.  Finally, we have presented applications of this simplification, showing 
that decreasing the computational complexity allows players to formulate strategies and courses 
of action more quickly when they have little or no knowledge of their opponent’s strategy. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
ALL 3X3 TOP-RATED PREFERENCE MINIMAL ORDINAL GAMES 
 
 
 
The following pages list all 729 3x3 top-rated preference minimal ordinal games.  Those 
highlighted in red are used with Example 4.1. 
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1,1 1,x 1,x   1,1 1,x 1,x   1,1 1,x 1,x   1,1 1,x 1,x   1,1 1,x 1,x   1,1 1,x 1,x 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,1 x,x x,x   x,1 X,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,1 x,x 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x X,x x,1   x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1 
                                         
                                         
1,1 1,x 1,x   1,1 1,x 1,x   1,1 1,x 1,x   1,x 1,1 1,x   1,x 1,1 1,x   1,x 1,1 1,x 
x,x x,x x,1   x,x x,x x,1   x,x x,x x,1   x,1 x,x x,x   x,1 x,x x,x   x,1 x,x x,x 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1   x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1 
                                         
                                         
1,x 1,1 1,x   1,x 1,1 1,x   1,x 1,1 1,x   1,x 1,1 1,x   1,x 1,1 1,x   1,x 1,1 1,x 
x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1   x,x x,x x,1   x,x x,x x,1 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1   x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1 
                                         
                                         
1,x 1,x 1,1   1,x 1,x 1,1   1,x 1,x 1,1   1,x 1,x 1,1   1,x 1,x 1,1   1,x 1,x 1,1 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,1 x,x x,x   x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,1 x,x 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1   x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1 
                                         
                                        
1,x 1,x 1,1   1,x 1,x 1,1   1,x 1,x 1,1   1,1 1,x x,x   1,1 1,x x,x   1,1 1,x x,x 
x,x x,x x,1   x,x x,x x,1   x,x x,x x,1   x,1 x,x 1,x   x,1 x,x 1,x   x,1 x,x 1,x 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1   x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1 
                                         
                                         
1,1 1,x x,x   1,1 1,x x,x   1,1 1,x x,x   1,1 1,x x,x   1,1 1,x x,x   1,1 1,x x,x 
x,x x,1 1,x   x,x x,1 1,x   x,x x,1 1,x   x,x x,x 1,1   x,x x,x 1,1   x,x x,x 1,1 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1   x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1 
                                         
                                         
1,x 1,1 x,x   1,x 1,1 x,x   1,x 1,1 x,x   1,x 1,1 x,x   1,x 1,1 x,x   1,x 1,1 x,x 
x,1 x,x 1,x   x,1 x,x 1,x   x,1 x,x 1,x   x,x x,1 1,x   x,x x,1 1,x   x,x x,1 1,x 
x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1   x,1 x,x x,x   x,x x,1 x,x   x,x x,x x,1 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
NASH SOLUTION SEARCH ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
 
The following is the program listing that implements the Nash solution search algorithm.  
The program is written in C. 
#include <stdio.h> 
 
#define unique_nash 0 
#define non_unique_nash 1 
#define no_nash  2 
 
unsigned long num_unique_nash=0; 
unsigned long num_non_unique_nash=0; 
unsigned long num_no_nash=0; 
 
static void p1_strategies(unsigned char *,unsigned char *,int,int,int); 
static void p2_strategies(unsigned char *,unsigned char *,int,int,int); 
static void set_location(unsigned char *,int,int,int,int); 
static int categorize_game(unsigned char *,unsigned char *,int,int); 
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int main( int  argc,  
  char  *argv[]) 
{ 
 int idx; 
 int num_rows, num_columns; 
 unsigned long total_num_games; 
 unsigned char *p1_game, *p2_game; 
 
 if (argc != 3) 
 { 
  printf("Error, need two arguments\n"); 
  return(1); 
 } 
 
 num_rows = atoi(argv[1]); 
 num_columns = atoi(argv[2]); 
 
 p1_game = malloc(num_rows*num_columns*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
 p2_game = malloc(num_rows*num_columns*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
 
 p1_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows,num_columns,0); 
 
 total_num_games = num_unique_nash + num_non_unique_nash +  
num_no_nash; 
 
printf("Results for %dx%d top-rated preference minimal ordinal  
games:\n",num_rows,num_columns); 
 printf("-------------------------------------------------------- 
---\n"); 
 printf("Total number of games: %d\n",total_num_games); 
 printf("Number of games with a unique Nash solution:%d\n", 
num_unique_nash); 
printf("Number of games with multiple non-unique Nash solutions:  
%d\n",num_non_unique_nash); 
 printf("Number of games with no Nash solution: %d\n", 
num_no_nash); 
 
 free(p1_game); 
 free(p2_game); 
 
 return(0); 
} 
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static void p1_strategies( unsigned char *p1_game,  
     unsigned char *p2_game, 
     int   num_rows,  
     int   num_columns,  
     int   column_idx) 
{ 
 int row_idx; 
 
 row_idx = 0; 
 
 while (row_idx < num_rows) 
 { 
  set_location(p1_game,1,row_idx,column_idx,num_columns); 
  if (column_idx == (num_columns-1)) 
  { 
   p2_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows, 
num_columns,0); 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   p1_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows,num_columns, 
column_idx+1); 
  } 
  set_location(p1_game,0,row_idx,column_idx,num_columns); 
  row_idx++; 
 } 
} 
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static void p2_strategies( unsigned char *p1_game,  
     unsigned char *p2_game, 
     int   num_rows,  
     int   num_columns,  
     int   row_idx) 
{ 
 int column_idx; 
 int game_type; 
 
 column_idx = 0; 
 
 while (column_idx < num_columns) 
 { 
  set_location(p2_game,1,row_idx,column_idx,num_columns); 
  if (row_idx == (num_rows-1)) 
  { 
   game_type = categorize_game(p1_game,p2_game, 
num_rows,num_columns); 
   if (game_type == unique_nash) 
   { 
    num_unique_nash++; 
   } 
   else if (game_type == non_unique_nash) 
   { 
    num_non_unique_nash++; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    num_no_nash++; 
   } 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   p2_strategies(p1_game,p2_game,num_rows,num_columns, 
row_idx+1); 
  } 
  set_location(p2_game,0,row_idx,column_idx,num_columns); 
  column_idx++; 
 } 
} 
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static void set_location( unsigned char *game,  
     int   value,  
     int   row_idx,  
     int   column_idx,  
     int   num_columns) 
{ 
 game[row_idx*num_columns+column_idx] = value; 
} 
 
static int categorize_game( unsigned char *p1_game,  
     unsigned char *p2_game, 
     int   num_rows, 
     int   num_columns) 
{ 
 int idx, num_nashes, game_size; 
 
 game_size = num_rows*num_columns; 
 num_nashes = 0; 
 idx = 0; 
 while (idx < game_size) 
 { 
  if ((p1_game[idx] == 1) && (p2_game[idx] == 1)) 
  { 
   num_nashes++; 
  } 
  idx++; 
 } 
 
 if (num_nashes > 1) 
 { 
  return(non_unique_nash); 
 } 
 else if (num_nashes == 1) 
 { 
  return(unique_nash); 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  return(no_nash); 
 } 
} 
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